Introspection, attention or awareness? The role of the frontal lobe in binocular rivalry by Natalia Zaretskaya & Marine Narinyan
GENERAL COMMENTARY
published: 21 July 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00527
Introspection, attention or awareness? The role of the
frontal lobe in binocular rivalry
Natalia Zaretskaya* and Marine Narinyan
Vision and Cognition Laboratory, Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
*Correspondence: natalia.zaretskaya@tuebingen.mpg.de
Edited by:
Srikantan S. Nagarajan, University of California, San Francisco, USA
Reviewed by:
Maurizio Mattia, Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy
Keywords: bistable perception, binocular rivalry, frontal lobe, consciousness, fMRI
A commentary on
Binocular rivalry: frontal activity relates
to introspection and action but not to
perception
by Frassle, S., Sommer, J., Jansen,
A., Naber, M., and Einhauser, W.
(2014). J. Neurosci. 34, 1738–1747. doi:
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4403-13.2014
Bistable stimuli are one of the most pop-
ular approaches to studying the neural
mechanism of conscious visual perception.
Such stimuli contain conflicting informa-
tion, which the visual system cannot inte-
grate into a unified percept. This causes
the perceptual state of the observer to
change every few seconds between the two
interpretations while the physical stimu-
lus remains the same. Binocular rivalry is
an example of such perceptual phenom-
ena with ambiguity achieved by presenting
one image to one eye and a different image
to the other eye. Perceptual changes dur-
ing binocular rivalry are particularly vivid,
and closely resemble a physical image
exchange.
The study of neural mechanisms of
bistable perception and binocular rivalry
revealed the involvement of multiple areas
across different levels of the visual hier-
archy (Sterzer et al., 2009). While the
activated stimulus-selective temporal lobe
areas depend on the stimulus category that
produces ambiguity, activity in the parietal
and frontal lobe seems to be common to
all stimuli and increases specifically during
transition periods between the two per-
cepts. The activation of the frontal lobe
areas is particularly intriguing. It suggests
that the mechanisms of conscious vision
might involve typical higher-level frontal
lobe functions such as attention, motiva-
tion and decision-making.
Previous studies of bistable percep-
tion relied on participants’ explicit reports
of their conscious state (most commonly
button presses). Under certain conditions,
however, perceptual states can be inferred
objectively, without self-report. An exam-
ple recent study by Frässle et al. (2014)
took advantage of two ocular reflexes,
optokinetic nystagmus and the pupillary
light reflex, and designed binocular rivalry
stimuli that selectively drive these reflexes.
Simple eye tracking measures provided
the authors with objective information
about their subjects’ perceptual changes
over time.
The authors used fMRI to monitor
brain activity when observers experienced
either genuine binocular rivalry or a
“replay” (a control condition which sim-
ulates rivalry-like perceptual alterations
by physically switching the stimulus pre-
sented to both eyes). These conditions
were performed while subjects either
actively reported their perceptual state or
just passively viewed the stimuli.
Such experimental design allowed
Frässle et al. to make an important obser-
vation. Comparison of rivalry with replay
in the passive viewing condition showed
less activation in the frontal cortex com-
pared to active report condition. The most
prominent decrease was observed in the
left superior and bilateral middle frontal
gyri. According to the authors, decrease of
frontal activity implies that frontal lobe
areas play a role in introspection and
motor response generation, but not in
perceptual changes per se.
Frontal lobe takes about one third
of the cortical volume, and is com-
prised of multiple architectonically
and functionally distinct areas (Stuss,
2011). Given this diversity it is impor-
tant to ask, which frontal lobe regions
are typically active during percep-
tual transitions in bistable perception,
and how they relate to the regions
reported by Frässle et al. as show-
ing reduced activation during passive
viewing.
Previous studies comparing perceptual
changes in rivalry with replay frequently
reported activation in the inferior frontal
cortex (IFC), middle frontal gyrus (MFG)
and superior frontal gyrus (SFG) (Lumer
et al., 1998; Zaretskaya et al., 2010; Knapen
et al., 2011; Frässle et al., 2014), located
mostly in the right hemisphere (Figure 1,
green). Frässle et al. on the other hand,
report decreased activity around the bilat-
eral MFG and bilateral SFG only (Figure
3 and Table 2 in Frässle et al., 2014,
Figure 1, red). Moreover, their right supe-
rior frontal activation is relatively far from
the locations reported previously. Thus,
the two activation maps in the frontal lobe
overlap only partially, namely around the
right MFG, and perhaps also the left SFG.
Activity of other rivalry-related frontal
nodes, in particular the right superior
frontal and the right inferior frontal ones,
did not decrease significantly. The latter
areas may therefore continue to play an
important role in perceptual changes even
without active motor report.
Besides, passive viewing involves not
only less self-monitoring, but also less
attention. Attention, in turn, is linked
to increased activity in frontal, but also
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FIGURE 1 | Rivalry-related brain network. Locations reported to be more active in rivalry
compared to instantaneous replay based on observer’s button presses in previous studies (green)
are plotted together with locations that were less active during passive viewing than during the
active report for the same comparison by Frässle et al. (red). Locations are plotted on a cortical
surface reconstruction of the MNI brain using PySurfer (http://pysurfer.github.io). Coordinates of the
locations in green are taken from the following studies: Lumer et al. (1998), Zaretskaya et al. (2010),
Knapen et al. (2011), Frässle et al. (2014).
parietal and extrastriate areas. The reduc-
tion of activity at multiple non-frontal
brain locations (Table 2 in Frässle et al.,
2014, Figure 1) is in our view com-
patible with a more general attention
effect. Difference in median dominance
durations between active and passive con-
ditions further support an attentional
explanation. The authors report that,
at least in the case of the pupil size-
based analyses, median dominance dura-
tions were longer in the passive view-
ing condition. It is known that not
only unreported but also unattended
rivalry can lead to longer dominance
durations (Paffen and Alais, 2011). In
sum some of the fMRI effects are dif-
ficult to disentangle from attentional
modulation.
Besides singling out the effects of self-
monitoring from those of attention during
passive viewing, it is important to dis-
sociate the effects of self-monitoring and
those of motor response. The ability to
report one’s conscious experience is not
a prerequisite for conscious perception,
but this may not hold for self-monitoring
and introspection. Can we be sure that we
are aware of something without reflect-
ing about it? In fact, several approaches
to consciousness define self-awareness
as its essential component (Van Gulick,
2014). This raises some more philosoph-
ical questions about the nature of con-
scious experience that are beyond the
scope of this review. In any case, we think
that future studies could benefit from
better segregation of different processes
that accompany self-report and equat-
ing attentional demands between different
conditions.
Almost two decades ago Crick and
Koch (1995) proposed that extrastriate
projections to the frontal cortex are neces-
sary for conscious perception, thus putting
the frontal lobes front and center in
the study of neural correlates of con-
sciousness. Indeed, experimental findings
on bistable perception over the years
supported the important role of frontal
areas in generating perceptual changes
(e.g., Sterzer and Kleinschmidt, 2007;
Weilnhammer et al., 2013). The study
of Frässle et al. does point to a possi-
ble confound of active motor report in
perception-related activity of some frontal
lobe sites. However, it does not rule out
the possibly important role of other frontal
lobe areas in generating conscious visual
experience.
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